Many Coalition Governments in Canada

Proportional representation would lead to more coalition governments representing a wider range of public opinion than the one-man one-party government we saw from 2006 to 2015.

Some Progressive Conservatives and democratic-reform conservatives may not agree with this description of the last government. However, they had their own coalition: from Sept. 24, 2001, to April 10, 2002, 19 MPs sat as the PC-DRC Coalition.

Canada has seen eleven coalition governments.

The Great Coalition 1864 –- 1867

The Canadian Confederation was founded by the Great Coalition government which served in the United Province of Canada from June 22, 1864, to 1867. Its six Ontario ministers included three Liberals: George Brown, William McDougall, and William P. Howland. (Oliver Mowat was not in cabinet but was a delegate to the Quebec Conference.) It was clearly a success. 

The Union Government 1917 — 1920

The Union Government of Canada (1917-20) was formed October 12, 1917, when Prime Minister Robert Borden formed a cabinet of twelve Conservatives, nine Liberals and Independents and one "Labour" member. In the December 1917 election the Conservatives ran as “Unionists” while the Liberal ran as “Liberal-Unionists.” It continued until July 1920 when Robert Borden retired. 

Ontario’s Farmer-Labour Coalition government 1919 — 1923

In 1919 the United Farmers of Ontario elected 45 MLAs, and 13 Labour MLAs won seats. They formed a coalition government with a bare majority of the 111 seats. The cabinet included two Labour MLAs.  

The federal Liberal Government of 1926 — 1930

In 1926 116 Liberal MPs were elected, a minority of the 245. A total of 38 others were elected: 26 Progressives or United Farmers, 4 Labour, and eight Liberal-Progressive MPs from Manitoba. The eight Liberal Progressives supported the Liberal government, making it in effect a majority government, and their leader Robert Forke (former leader of the Progressives from 1922 to 1926) was given a cabinet position, making it in effect a coalition government. Forke’s MPs continued to caucus as Liberal-Progressives and criticized some government positions.

The Saskatchewan Conservative-Progressive Coalition Government of 1929 — 1934

The 1929 Saskatchewan election saw the incumbent Liberals win only 28 of the 64 seats. They met the House but were defeated by a Coalition of 24 Conservatives, five Progressives, and six Independents who formed a coalition cabinet which governed for five years.  

Manitoba Liberal-Progressive coalition 1932 – 1936

The Progressive Party of Manitoba was the governing party in Manitoba from 1922 to 1932. The Manitoba Liberal Party joined the government in early 1932, and three members of the party were brought into cabinet in a coalition with the Progressives ahead of the June 1932 provincial election. They formed not only a coalition but an electoral alliance to hold off a challenge from the Conservatives, winning under a variety of hybrid labels. The two parties had effectively become united by 1936, when they won re-election as a minority government with external support from Social Credit.

Ontario Liberal-Progressives 1934 — 1937

In the 1934 Ontario election the remaining Progressive MLAs led by former UFO cabinet minister Harry Nixon ran as Liberal-Progressives in an alliance with the Ontario Liberal Party led by former UFO member Mitch Hepburn. Four were elected and sat as Liberal—Progressives, technically in a coalition government with the Liberals, until 1937 when they ran as Liberals.

Manitoba unity government 1940 – 1948

In 1940, all Manitoba political parties joined a non-partisan administration formed to meet the province’s wartime demands. The CCF did not remain long when none of their proposals were accepted, but the unity government continued until 1948.

BC Liberal-Conservative coalition 1941 — 1951

In the 1941 election the Liberal government lost its majority, winning only 7 more seats than the CCF. They formed a coalition government with the Conservatives which lasted until it collapsed in 1951. Rather than forming an electoral alliance, they adopted the preferential ballot, with the objective of supporting each other against the CCF. The voters surprised them, when the 1952 election gave unexpected power to the BC Social Credit party (nominally led by a federal MP from Alberta) which soon abolished the preferential ballot.

NDP-Liberal Democrat coalition in Manitoba 1969 — 1971  

In Manitoba’s 1969 election, the Progressive Conservative government dropped to only 22 MLAs, against 28 NDP MLAs, but the seven other MLAs held the balance of power. A plan for an everyone-but-NDP coalition, including five Liberals, one Social Credit, and one independent former PC, was about to be put into action when Liberal MLA Laurent Desjardins refused to join with the Tories, left the Liberal caucus, sat as a Liberal Democrat, and joined Ed Schreyer’s government as a Liberal Democrat, making it a coalition government until, in 1971, he joined the NDP, and the government served a full term in office, re-elected in 1973.

NDP-Liberal coalition in Saskatchewan, 1999 — 2003

In the 1999 Saskatchewan election NDP Premier Roy Romanow lost his majority. The three-member Liberal caucus joined a coalition, with cabinet seats, which lasted a full term.

Six stable minority governments

Six Liberal minority governments were able to govern with the support of the third parties.

Liberal Canadian government 1921 — 1925

The King minority government's ability to retain the confidence of the House from 1921 to 1925 depended partly on the strong anti-tariff policy favoured by the Progressive Party.

Pearson’s two governments 1963 — 1965 and 1965 — 1968

The minority governments of 1963–65 and 1965–68 won over the NDP with legislation that included a considerable expansion of social programs: universal health care, the Canada Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan, and the Canada Student Loans Plan. 

Pierre Trudeau’s government 1972 — 1974

The minority government of 1972–74 obtained NDP support by enacting, or by committing itself to enact, regulation of election expenses and the establishment of Petro-Canada and the Foreign Investment Review Agency.

Ontario Liberal—NDP Accord 1985 — 1987

In Ontario, the Liberals governed from 1985 to 1987 under an explicit written Accord with the NDP.

Paul Martin’s government 2004 — 2006

The minority government of Paul Martin (2004–06) governed with the support of the NDP when it amended its proposed budget to increase spending on social programs and defer tax cuts for large corporations.

With proportional representation, will my region lose representation?

With proportional representation, will my local region lose representation? Will my MP be from somewhere away?

This is a common fear of the 48% of Canadians who live outside Canada’s eight big metropolitan areas.

Pure proportional representation is not feasible

Pure proportional representation is not feasible for Canada. In fact it is not even possible constitutionally. Israel and the Netherlands have pure proportional representation, with all MPs elected from nation-wide closed party lists. Both the Hon. Stéphane Dion and the Law Commission of Canada have shown clearly why it should be rejected for Canada.

MPs remain accountable

Proportional representation systems can include models ensuring that all Members of Parliament remain personally accountable to their constituents.

The model I am describing is the made-in-Canada model designed and recommended by the Law Commission of Canada, where you have two votes: one for the candidate you like best for local MP, and one for the regional candidate you prefer of the party you want to see in government.

Your region will not lose representation

Your region will not lose representation: it will have just as many MPs as it does today.

You are guaranteed two things which equal better local representation:

1.         A local MP who will still put your area at the top of her priority list.

2.         An MP whose views best reflect your values, someone you helped elect in your local riding or your local region.

Examples of regions

I am using regions which typically have 11 MPs each: seven local and four regional. This keeps all MPs accountable to a local riding or local region.

The Atlantic provinces will lose nothing, since each province keeps the same number of MPs it has today. The 483,835 Atlantic voters who voted Conservative or NDP will gain representation. (See footnote as to Greens.)

In Ontario, my simulation uses 10 regions. Northern Ontario keeps its nine MPs (six local MPs, three regional MPs). Southwestern Ontario (London—Windsor) keeps its 11 MPs, as does West Central Ontario (Barrie—Bruce—Guelph) with 10 MPs, South Central Ontario (Hamilton—Waterloo—Niagara) with 16 MPs, Peel—Halton with 16 MPs, North York—Etobicoke with 13 MPs, Central Toronto—Scarborough with 12 MPs, York—Durham with 15 MPs, Mid-Eastern Ontario (Kingston—Peterborough) with nine MPs, and Ottawa—Cornwall with 10 MPs.

Manitoba keeps its 14 MPs. My simulation lets Winnipeg keep its eight, and the rest of Manitoba keep its six (four local MPs, two regional MPs).

Saskatchewan keeps its 14 MPs. The nine local MPs will give each part of the province representation.

In Alberta, my simulation lets the Calgary metropolitan area keep its 11 MPs, the Edmonton metropolitan area keep its 11 MPs, and the rest of Alberta keep its 12 MPs (the seven or eight local MPs will give each part of the province representation).

In BC, my simulation lets the Lower Mainland keep its 26 MPs, the Interior and North keep its nine MPs, and Vancouver Island keep its seven MPs.

In Quebec, my current example lets the region of Outaouais—Abitibi-Témiscamingue—Nord keep its six MPs, the Montreal—West region keep its six MPs, the region of Laval—Laurentides—Lanaudière keep its 13 MPs, the region of Montreal-est keep its 12 MPs, the Longueuil— Montérégie-centre—Suroît region keep its 12 MPs, the region of Estrie—Mauricie—Centre-du-Québec—Montérégie-est keep its 11 MPs, the Quebec City—Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean—Côte-Nord region keep its 11 MPs, and the Chaudière-Appalaches—Bas-Saint-Laurent—Gaspésie region keep its seven MPs.

My Riding Will Get Bigger with PR: How Will That Work in Practice? Won't My MP be Farther Away?

For voters:

Outside metropolitan areas, Local MPs and Regional MPs will both have more than one office, as many MPs already do, if you just want service from the closest MP.

But you will now have several MPs competing to serve you. You can get representation or service from an MP you helped elect, whose values are closer to yours.

Your Regional MPs will likely hold office hours rotating across their region, just as they do in Scotland. They will want to serve constituents in all parts of the riding. They'll have to work harder, which they may not like. But if their party does better in the next election, it will elect more Local MPs in your region, so it may very well not get any Regional MPs in the next election. That’s why your Regional MP is working as a shadow Local MP: he or she may be a Local MP next time.

For candidates:

Yes, the riding is larger, but in return, voters have competing MPs. Yes, you are running in a larger local riding, but in return, if the party does badly in local ridings in your region it will elect some regional MPs, so don't complain about competition from the regional MPs: one day, you may be one.

Yes, MPs represent everyone who wants their help. Both local MPs and regional MPs do that. Many voters didn't want the previous MP to speak for them. We have diverse voices, and we need diverse MPs.

Will proportional representation swamp the rural voice? No, as shown here. 

Does it still work proportionally?

     

If Canada in split up into 32 little local regions, does every vote still count? If only 38% of the MPs are regional MPs, is that enough to make it a real proportional representation system?

Yes, but not quite perfectly. The exceptions are:

1. New Brunswick has never in its history elected all ten MPs from one party, as it did in 2015. With a mixed-member PR model, New Brunswick voters elect six local MPs and four provincial MPs. Although 51.6% of those voters cast Liberal ballots, that’s not quite enough to justify electing six of the ten MPs. Liberal bonus: 1 MP.
2. Toronto voters also elected Liberals in every riding, with 52.2% of the votes. This model gives Toronto 15 local MPs and 10 regional MPs. Liberal bonus: 2 MPs.
3. Vancouver Island voters elected six NDP MPs with 33.3% of the vote, plus Elizabeth May, This model gives them four local MPs and three regional MPs. NDP bonus: 1 MP.
4. Nationally, Green Party voters cast 3.4% of the votes. If Germany’s 5% threshold were applied, they would elect no MPs outside BC where they got 8.2% and should elect three MPs. With no threshold they should elect ten MPs. Because of the smallish regions this model gives them five MPs.

As well, with any calculation you get rounding anomalies. With the points above, they happen to add up as follows: Liberal bonus 5, NDP bonus 3, from Greens 5, from Conservatives 3.

Final result: on the votes cast last October, instead of Liberal voters electing 184 MPs (54% of them) with only 39.5% of the votes, they would have elected 142 (5 more than the perfectly proportional 137). Conservatives 106 (seven more than last October), NDP 70 (26 more than last October), Bloc 15 (five more than last October), and Green five (four more than last October.)

Make Every Vote Count

Why would any Liberal MP vote for this? They might remember that Stephen Harper won a false majority in 2011, and a huge number of Canadians voted Liberal last October on their promise to Make Every Vote Count. Never again should Canadians see a one-man one-party government win unbridled power with support from only 39% of the voters.

And they might think of the 15 missing members of their caucus, who would have been elected by 1,388,076 unrepresented or under-represented Liberal voters (see footnote on Liberals).

 

More people would vote, and vote differently

As Prof. Dennis Pilon says: "Now keep in mind that, when you change the voting system, you also change the incentives that affect the kinds of decisions that voters might make. For instance, we know that, when every vote counts, voters won't have to worry about splitting the vote, or casting a strategic vote. Thus, we should expect that support for different parties might change."

And when every vote counts, turnout will be higher -- perhaps 7% higher. So, when voters have more choice, the results will be far more representative of our diverse population and their diverse views. Who can say what would be the result of real democratic elections?

You have two votes and more choice

With two votes, you can vote for the party you want in government. And you can also vote for the local candidate you like best regardless of party, without hurting your party, since it's the second (regional) ballot that determines the party make-up of the legislature. About 32% of voters split their ballots this way in New Zealand with a similar system.
 

Local MPs become more independent

This makes it easier for local MPs to get the support of people of all political stripes. They can earn support for their constituency-representation credentials, not just for their party. This boosts the kind of support MPs bring with them into the House of Commons, thus strengthening their independence.

Democratic nominations

How would regional candidates be nominated? Just like local candidates, except the nomination meeting is choosing more than one candidate. Party members will likely nominate a balanced group of candidates including women, minorities and indigenous people. It could be done on-line, and with live conventions. Likely party members in each region would decide to nominate the same candidates already nominated in the local ridings, and some additional regional candidates. 

Candidates should be democratically nominated in order to qualify for election expense rebates.

Polls show over 70% of Canadians support proportional representation.

More details on what respect for Canada’s political diversity would look like.

More flexibility

With any proportional model, the new boundaries will be set by new Boundaries Commissions. But they can have more flexibility. Since the overall partisan make-up of Parliament is based on the regional ballot totals across the region, making remote ridings like Labrador and Kenora exceptionally small is no longer such an issue.

Footnote on Liberals

Liberal voters now unrepresented or under-represented – 1,388,076 of them -- would have elected more MPs.

In Calgary, the 210,129 under-represented Liberal voters would have elected two more MPs like Nirmala Naidoo and Matt Grant or Kerry Cundal. In Edmonton, the 163,063 under-represented Liberals would have elected another MP like Karen Leibovici. In the rest of Alberta, the 100,251 unrepresented Liberals would have elected two MPs like Kyle Harrietha from Fort McMurray and Chandra Kastern from Red Deer or Ryan Maguhn from Hinton or Glen Allan from Medicine Hat.

In the BC Interior and North, the 163,975 under-represented Liberals would have elected two more MPs like Karley Scott and Tracy Calogheros  or Cindy Derkaz. On Vancouver Island, the 100,557 unrepresented Liberals would have elected an MP like David Merner or Carrie Powell-Davidson.  

In Saskatchewan, the 131,681 under-represented Liberals would have elected two more MPs like Tracy Muggli from Saskatoon and Della Anaquod from Regina or aboriginal leader Lawrence Joseph.

In Manitoba outside Winnipeg, the 81,827 unrepresented Liberals would have elected an MP like Rebecca Chartrand or Brandon’s Jodi Wyman.   

In southwest Ontario, the 207,203 under-represented Liberals would have elected two more MPs like Chatham’s Katie Omstead and Lori Baldwin-Sands from St. Thomas or Windsor’s Frank Schiller. In west-central Ontario, the 229,390 under-represented Liberals would have elected two more MPs like Brian Tamblyn in Barrie and Allan Thompson in Huron or Kimberley Love in Owen Sound or Orillia’s Liz Riley.

    
Footnote on Greens

Many people expect the Green vote to double once ever vote counts. In that case, an ideal PR system would let Green voters elect 22 MPs. How many would this model let them elect? Well, 24 MPs. Rounding anomalies can even help a small party sometimes.

Accountable MPs and Open Lists: the key to a Canadian proportional representation model

A made-in-Canada model of proportional representation will never feature closed lists of candidates for MP. All MPs must be personally accountable to voters, not to just to those who nominated them as candidates.

Canadians don’t want a Parliament like the Netherlands, with 11 parties under their “pure proportional” model, nor like Israel’s. “Pure-list-PR” with candidates appointed by central parties, and no local MPs, will never work for Canada.

Even a mixed member model like Scotland’s with additional regional MPs elected from regional closed lists would not be fully accepted in Canada.

So we’re looking at mixed member models where you can vote for candidates both in a local riding and in a local region, like the one in this six-minute video designed by the Law Commission of Canada.

Pour information en français, voir la page 5: La Commission du droit du Canada recommande un système mixte.

The majority of MPs are still local MPs. Regional MPs are elected by those voters whose votes did not elect a local MP. Every vote counts to help elect an MP, as far as reasonably possible. (Maybe, in metropolitan areas, local districts might even elect several MPs, not just one?)

Open lists are practical

A much better precedent exists in the German province of Bavaria. Open lists have worked well in their mixed member model since 1949. Unlike our Law Commission model, Bavaria has no option to vote for the party list. You vote only for a local candidate in your local riding and for a regional candidate in your local region.

The Law Commission of Canada

As the Law Commission of Canada concluded back in 2004, "Based on the feedback received during our consultation process, many Canadian voters would also most likely desire the flexibility of open lists in a mixed member proportional system. In essence, allowing voters to choose a candidate from the list provides voters with the ability to select a specific individual and hold them accountable for their actions should they be elected."

That also means the regional MPs must be elected from regions small enough that the MPs will be accountable to a real local region.

How will regional MPs work for constituents? Here's how they do it in Scotland. 

Ontario’s 2007 model was not the answer

Across Ontario in the 2007 referendum, 63.1% voted against MMP. About 31% were simply against proportional representation. Many more were voters who wanted all MPPs to be personally elected, not on closed lists. Many more were voters who wanted all MPPs to be anchored in their own local region, not on province-wide lists. And 7.5% were voters outside Toronto who disliked province-wide lists even more than Toronto voters did. As Prof. Henry Milner wrote just after the referendum "opponents hammered away on the claim that there would be 39 MPPs beholden to party headquarters instead of voters. . . . in a short campaign, this image of unrepresentative party hacks from Toronto getting in through the back door was fatal.”

Designing a made-in-Canada system

Many Canadians who voted Liberal want assurance that never again will a divisive political leader win 100% of the power with 39% of the votes. And never again will voters have to vote against something, or vote for a less-preferred candidate to block the election of one even less preferred. So we don’t want a model where only half the votes count.

Groups like Fair Vote Canada have been saying “Make every vote count” for years. The new government of Canada was elected on a platform that said “We will make every vote count.” They pledged an all-party Parliamentary committee that will deliver its recommendations to Parliament, and legislation to enact electoral reform introduced within 18 months of forming government, following varied and robust consultations with Canadians, and serious, responsible study with expert assistance.

That process is about to begin.

Fair Vote Canada’s campaign says a model of Proportional Representation for Canada must respect the need for all MPs to face the voters and be accountable to voters.

For example, Bavaria’s seven regions are too large to make regional MPs accountable to a local region. Do we want a model with regions averaging only eight or nine MPs each? The regional MPs would be more accountable, but the model would be a little less proportional. Or do we want one with regions averaging 12 or 14 MPs? And do we want the local MPs to be 60% of the total? Or 65%, making the new ridings a little smaller, but the model would be a little less proportional?

These details will matter to the MPs who will face getting re-elected under the new model.

The principle

But details will not matter as much as the principle: make every vote count to help elect an MP, and make all MPs personally accountable to voters.

The implementation of truly representative government in Canada, via an element of proportional representation, will in future be seen as every bit as much an advance for the nation as old age pensions or medicare.

Democratic nominations

Candidates in federal elections getting 10% of the vote receive public subsidy (rebates) of 60% of election expenses up to the approved limit.

Today, we hear of parties appointing candidates. Why should an undemocratic process be rewarded?

 

We should change Canada's electoral finance system to require registered federal parties that wish to receive a candidate's election expense subsidy to nominate that candidate democratically, that is, by vote of all their members (or their elected delegates) living in the electoral district or region with valid memberships as of a specified cut-off date.

Canada needs democratically-nominated candidates

Candidates in federal elections getting 10% of the vote receive public subsidy (rebates) of 60% of election expenses up to the approved limit.

Today, we hear of parties appointing candidates. Why should an undemocratic process be rewarded?

Fair Vote Canada says we should change Canada's electoral finance system "to require registered federal parties that wish to receive a candidate's election expense subsidy to nominate that candidate democratically, that is, by vote of all their members (or their delegates) living in the electoral district or region with valid memberships as of a specified cut-off date.”

Appointed candidates?

Any public discussion of Proportional Representation with any multi-member riding component quickly leads to comments on “candidates appointed by the party.” This happens whether, for example, it’s in a seven-MP STV district, or in a 12-MP MMP district with five regional MPs and eight or ten regional candidates (such as the seven local ones and a few regional-only ones) nominated and ranked by each party. This is unfair, since parties already appoint local candidates when they choose to.

Democracy is the core

Proportional representation means fair and unrestricted competition among political parties presenting democratically-nominated candidates. Democracy is at its core, not more power to party elites.

Parties can nominate several candidates at once democratically, in the same way they nominate single candidates: by vote of the membership in the district or region. Depending on local geography, it might be entirely an in-person meeting, or might include online voting.
 
If a major party finds it necessary in a very rare case to appoint, why should they not be encouraged to follow the German example: if a nomination meeting faced serious problems, call another meeting rather than appoint?   Michael Chong’s Reform Act aimed at preventing party leaders from holding the appointment power. Why should parties qualify for election expense rebates for a candidate not democratically nominated?

New parties may need to appoint candidates in ridings where they have no membership, but those will be token candidates spending nothing, and not getting the 10% of the vote required to qualify for rebates of 60% of election expense.

At one time some parties needed to appoint candidates in order to nominate more women, but this is no longer necessary.

Open-list mixed member proportional models: The Bavarian example

Canadians can consider several models of proportional representation, including Bavaria's.

Scotland’s regional mixed-member model

Scotland’s regional mixed-member elections are simple and practical: you elect a local MP plus regional MPs.

Every vote counts. If your vote didn’t count to elect a local MP, it will help elect a regional MP from your local region, to top-up the local results.

You have two votes, a local vote for a local MP, and a regional vote. Your local region has nine local MPs and seven regional MPs.

To elect an MP in a 16-MP region, your party will need about 5% of the regional votes. This is unlike the “pure proportional representation” system of the Netherlands, where they have no local MPs, and no threshold to win seats. In their last election they got 11 parties in Parliament. Voters for an Animal Rights party cast 1.9% of the votes and elected two MPs, while four other parties got fewer than 5% of the votes.

In Scotland you can vote for a local candidate of a different party than the party you want to see in government. New Zealand has a similar two-vote system, where about 32% of voters split their ballots that way. This makes it easier for local MPs to get the support of people of all political stripes. They can earn support for their constituency-representation credentials, not just for their party. This boosts the kind of support MPs bring with them into the House of Commons, thus strengthening their independence.

Improved Scottish model

But Canadians would want one big improvement on the Scottish model: no closed lists. You can vote for the regional candidate of your party that you like best.

The Law Commission of Canada recommended a model that, like Sweden’s, gives voters a choice: you can vote for a regional candidate personally, or for the party’s regional list. Watch this six-minute video.

No one knows how many voters would use the list option: with a similar choice in Brazil only about 10% do. Yet many PR-sceptics will scream “backroom-dominated party list.” And they will ask a valid question: how many personal votes does it take to move a candidate up the list? The Law Commission left the “personal threshold” detail to be decided.

Bavaria’s model

German federal elections use a mixed member system like Scotland’s. But since 1949 the German province of Bavaria has used an open-list variation, with no party-list option at all. You vote for a local candidate in your riding, and for a regional candidate in your region. (They have seven regions.)

Even simpler than the Law Commission model: no personal threshold. The ranking is done entirely by the voters. As usual, you have two votes: one for a local MP, one for a regional MP. The list order has no legal weight.

Does this process result in the list order prevailing anyway? In 2003, preferences led to the defeat of 25 advantageously positioned regional candidates, to the benefit of 25 others who were less so, out of a total of 88 elected regional members. Just look at the 1998 charts for Munich on pages 55 and 56 of Prof. Massicotte’s working document.

Note the spectacular fall of Minister Ursula Männle from the 3rd place assigned by her party to the 42nd decided by the voters’ individual preferences. This ensured her defeat.

Prof. Massicotte concludes “As a result of preferences, electoral rivalry between parties has a new level of competition between candidates of the same party within each region. . . . The Bavarian experience shows that voters take the possibility offered them very seriously . . . and that the preference system has a major impact on which list candidates get elected.”

Although every local candidate is also a regional candidate, some regional candidates are “regional-only.” This is necessary in case a party sweeps a region so massively that it elects some regional MPs on top of all the local MPs.

This also let the party members nominate a slate better balanced by gender and minorities, creating more voter choice. The Law Commission of Canada wanted to “support voters who decide to trust a political party’s choice of list candidates by allowing them to vote for the party slate . . . to promote successful election of women.” But Bavaria’s model also does this. And the position of women in Canada’s Parliament has improved since the 2004 Law Commission Report.

How does the Bavarian model work?

Is the regional ranking done only by a small group of voters who didn’t vote for the star candidate? No risk of that in Bavaria. The ranking is by the total number of votes cast for a candidate in the local race, added to the total number of regional votes cast for that candidate in all the other seats in the region (but not in the seat where he or she ran locally -- that would give double weight to those voters, so the regional list in a riding excludes the local candidates). Note that every local candidate is also a regional candidate.

The party vote is also a total of the two votes. Unlike most MMP models, Bavaria counts your local vote as a vote for a party, just as it counts your regional vote. This reduces the scope for the “Berlusconi trick” that ruined Italy’s system (running local candidates under a different party name than the regional candidates, twin parties, one a clone of the other).

Some people like the “best-runners-up” model used in the German province of Baden-Wurttemberg: no regional candidates at all, no lists. The regional MPs elected to top up the local results are the local candidates who, in that region, got the most votes without winning the local seat.

The effect of the Bavarian model is a hybrid with the best-runner-up model. You have regional candidates, but those who did well locally without winning the local seat have an advantage for the regional seat.

In the 2013 Bavarian election, of the 90 regional deputies, 13 were regional-only candidates who won election from regional votes alone, despite not receiving any local votes. Four regional candidates standing at the head of the regional list were not ranked first in the final count. (The regional candidates included all 977 local candidates -- an average of 11 in each riding -- plus 785 regional-only candidates, an average of  10 candidates from each party in each region.) 

Bavaria’s 5% threshold rule applies to parties and “organized groups” such as the “Free Voters” movement which denies it is a party, but has met the 5% threshold in the last two elections. In 2008 it became the third party, with more seats than the Greens, repeated in 2013.

The trend to having two votes, now universal in Germany, began in Bavaria in 1949. They wanted to let voters not only elect a local MP, but also express a preference for one of the regional candidates of the party they were voting for.

One reason Bavaria likes this system is that it tends to be as much of a one-party province as Alberta used to be, so it needs competition within its conservative party. The CSU governed in a liberal-conservative coalition in 2008-2013, but otherwise has governed alone since 1962.

How big are the regions?

Bavaria’s stable model has used seven regions since 1950, with an average of 23 MPs each. Some are as small as 17 MPPs (9 local, 8 regional), while the largest region (Munich) has 58 MPPs.

“I support reforms to add elements of proportional representation that also ensure that Members of Parliament remain directly accountable to their constituents” said Dominic LeBlanc. “Do we want to keep that bond between a specific MP and a specific group of Canadians?" asked Justin Trudeau.  “Canadians voted for real change, for a government that puts their needs ahead of the party's. A government that celebrates our diversity, and not takes a divisive approach” said Minister Maryam Monsef.

The regions have to be small and local enough to make that true, while still large enough to be at least moderately proportional.

 

Polls show over 70% of Canadians support proportional representation.

The mixed member proportional system used in Scotland and Wales, and recommended for Canada by the Law Commission of Canada, has all MPs tied to ridings or local regions; MPs would be elected in each riding but they'd be augmented by regional MPs elected from candidates in a local region. Justin Trudeau has never ruled that out at all, as long as the regions aren't too large.

Is Bavaria’s regional ballot too large and complex? In 2003 the number of spoiled or rejected votes was 1.2% for the local vote, 1.9% for the regional vote. Munich, with 58 MPPs, had a ballot with 469 names. No wonder some were rejected.

I suggest no regions larger than 18 MPs, preferably about 12 MPs on average.

More details of Bavaria’s model

Bavaria used to use the Scottish "highest average" (D'Hondt quota) but in 1990 this was declared unconstitutional, so they switched to "largest remainder" (Hare). Wouldn't it be lovely to live in a country where lack of full proportionality is unconstitutional?

Although they use a 5% threshold for representation, they give state funding to any party that reaches 1% of the regional votes.

Bavaria has almost half their MPs elected from the regions. Canada would use a higher ratio of local MPs.

Bavaria originally imposed a 10% threshold at the regional level, but in 1973 opted for a 5% threshold applicable to the whole province.

Bavaria’s 5% threshold rule has an unusual feature: a party needs to pass the 5% threshold province-wide to win even a local seat; no independents. Canada would never copy that feature.

Unlike German federal elections, the ballot had no circle for the voter to mark after the party name. If voters nevertheless marked the party name alone on the regional ballot, it was counted as a valid vote for the party, but had no effect on the ranking of the regional candidates. Only 1% of voters did this in 2013.

Update: the 2018 election: 

How well did Bavaria’s open-list MMP system work in 2018? They elected 205 MLAs: 91 directly elected, 114 regional top-ups elected from open regional lists. The governing CSU lost their majority, and formed a coalition government with the centre-right “Free Voters.” This was not simple, since the “Free Voters” had never whipped their members votes, but now had to.

2018 results:
Christian Social Union: 85 MLAs, all local (was 101 in 2013)
Greens: 38, 6 local, 32 regional (was 17)
Free Voters: 27, all regional (was 17)
AfD: 22, all regional (was 0 – new party)
Social Democrats: 22, all regional (was 42)
Liberals: 11, all regional (had been 0, below 5% threshold)

Of the 114 list seats, 31 were elected thanks to voters moving them up the list, while 83 would have been elected with closed lists. 

Did the list-topper (first on the list) always get elected? Almost. In the region of Lower Bavaria, the liberal FDP elected only 1 MLA, and he had been second on their regional list.

One of the more unusual new Green MLAs is Paul Knoblach, a 12th-generation Bavarian farmer. Knoblach was among the CSU’s longtime supporters and had volunteered for its campaigns. But in 2018, at age 64, he ran for the legislature for the first time. And he did it as a Green. He was number 12 on the Green regional list for Lower Franconia, but he got enough attention that the voters moved him up to 3rd place and into the legislature.

Did the open lists hurt women? I did not check most results, but the SPD zippers their lists, and I noticed in Upper Palatinate the SPD elected 2 MLAs, list numbers 1 and 3 (two women). Conversely, in Middle Franconia the SPD elected 4 MLAs: 1, 2, 3, and 5 (three men). 

All CSU members were elected directly, no list seats.

Here are the details of three of the seven regions:

In Upper Palatinate:
3 Free Voter list seats: 1, 2, 4
2 AfD list seats: 1, 3
2 Green list seats: 1, 2
2 SPD list seats: 1, 3 (two women)
1 FDP list seats: 1 

In Lower Franconia:
3 Green seats: 1 direct (was #2 on list), 2 list seats (1 and 12)
2 AfD seats: 1, 2
2 SPD list seats: 1, 2
2 Free Voter list seats: 1, 5 (5: Anna Stolz, lawyer, Mayor of the City of Arnstein; had been elected Mayor in 2014 as the joint candidate of the Greens, SPD, and Free Voters; the local Greens said they were very proud of her as Mayor.)
1 FDP seat: 1

In Upper Bavaria (which includes Munich):
17 Green seats: 5 elected directly (they had been 1, 2, 5, 10, and 38 on the list) and 12 elected from the list: (3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 22, 25, 36)
8 Free Voter list seats: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12 (12: Hans Friedl, “a socially ecologically liberal voice, an immigration law based on the Canadian model, no privatization of the drinking water supply, a clear rejection of the privatization of motorways” so the voters moved him up to #8)
7 SPD list seats: 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 14, 23
6 AfD list seats: 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 22
5 FDP list seats: 1, 2, 7, 13, 16

Canadian adaptations

As well as allowing independents, Canada could need other changes to the Bavarian model.

We would need smaller regions than they use.
 

They use a 5% threshold province-wide for a party’s voters to elect a Regional MP. The effective threshold for smaller regions would already be at least 5%. But we might want some guarantee that a regional micro-party might not run in some region of Ontario or Quebec and elect a single regional MP with only 1% of the vote in the province, if the public expects this would not happen. A threshold of 4% or 5% applied province-by-province would prevent this. In Europe, the threshold is generally 4% or 5%, and New Zealand has been debating which of these numbers to use.

 

Take the Green Party in Quebec. With PR, assume their vote doubles, to 4.4%. If Montérégie is a 12-MP region (excluding a couple of ridings in Montérégie-est), and the Green vote doubled, Green voters there would have cast enough votes to elect their star Quebec candidate JiCi Lauzon. The same in 12-MP Montréal-est (deputy leader Daniel Green), in 11-MP Estrie—Mauricie—Centre-du-Q—Montérégie-est (Corina Bastiani?) and someone in 13-MP Laval—Laurentides—Lanaudière. Four MPs, just as they would deserve. A threshold of 4% lets them be elected, 5% does not.

(Note: updated after 2018 election)