Canadians
can consider several models of proportional representation, including Bavaria's.
Scotland’s regional
mixed-member model
Scotland’s
regional mixed-member elections are simple and practical: you elect a local MP
plus regional MPs.
Every
vote counts. If your vote didn’t count to elect a local MP, it will help elect
a regional MP from your local region, to top-up the local results.
You
have two votes, a local vote for a local MP, and a regional vote. Your local region
has nine local MPs and seven regional MPs.
To
elect an MP in a 16-MP region, your party will need about 5% of the regional votes.
This is unlike the “pure proportional representation” system of the
Netherlands, where they have no local MPs, and no threshold to win seats. In
their last election they got 11 parties in Parliament. Voters for an Animal
Rights party cast 1.9% of the votes and elected two MPs, while four other
parties got fewer than 5% of the votes.
In Scotland you can vote for a local candidate of a different party than the party
you want to see in government. New Zealand has a similar two-vote system, where
about 32% of voters split their ballots that way. This makes it easier for
local MPs to get the support of people of all political stripes. They can earn
support for their constituency-representation credentials, not just for their
party. This boosts the kind of support MPs bring with them into the House of
Commons, thus strengthening their independence.
Improved Scottish model
But Canadians
would want one big improvement on the Scottish model: no closed lists. You can
vote for the regional candidate of your party that you like best.
The
Law Commission of Canada recommended a model that, like Sweden’s, gives voters
a choice: you can vote for a regional candidate personally, or for the party’s
regional list. Watch this six-minute video.
No one knows how many voters would use the list option: with a
similar choice in Brazil only about 10% do. Yet
many PR-sceptics will scream “backroom-dominated party list.” And they will ask
a valid question: how many personal votes does it take to move a candidate up
the list? The Law Commission left the “personal threshold” detail to be decided.
Bavaria’s model
German
federal elections use a mixed member system like Scotland’s. But since 1949 the
German province of Bavaria has used an open-list variation, with no party-list
option at all. You vote for a local candidate in your riding, and for a regional candidate in your region. (They have seven regions.)
Even
simpler than the Law Commission model: no personal threshold. The
ranking is done entirely by the voters. As usual, you have two votes: one for a
local MP, one for a regional MP. The list order has no legal weight.
Does this
process result in the list order prevailing anyway? In 2003, preferences led to
the defeat of 25 advantageously positioned regional candidates, to the benefit
of 25 others who were less so, out of a total of 88 elected regional members.
Just look at the 1998 charts for Munich on pages 55 and 56 of Prof. Massicotte’s working document.
Note the
spectacular fall of Minister Ursula Männle from the 3rd place assigned by her
party to the 42nd decided by the voters’ individual preferences. This ensured
her defeat.
Prof. Massicotte
concludes “As a result of preferences, electoral rivalry between parties has a
new level of competition between candidates of the same party within each
region. . . . The Bavarian experience shows that voters take the possibility
offered them very seriously . . . and that the preference system has a major
impact on which list candidates get elected.”
Although
every local candidate is also a regional candidate, some regional candidates
are “regional-only.” This is necessary in case a party sweeps a region so
massively that it elects some regional MPs on top of all the local MPs.
This also
let the party members nominate a slate better balanced by gender and
minorities, creating more voter choice. The Law Commission of Canada wanted to
“support
voters who decide to trust a political party’s choice of list candidates by
allowing them to vote for the party slate . . . to promote successful election
of women.” But Bavaria’s model also does this. And the position of women in Canada’s
Parliament has improved since the 2004 Law Commission Report.
How does the Bavarian model
work?
Is the
regional ranking done only by a small group of voters who didn’t vote for the
star candidate? No risk of that in Bavaria. The ranking is by the total number
of votes cast for a candidate in the local race, added to the total number of
regional votes cast for that candidate in all the other seats in the region
(but not in the seat where he or she ran locally -- that would give double weight
to those voters, so the regional list in a riding excludes the local candidates).
Note that every local candidate is also a regional candidate.
The
party vote is also a total of the two votes. Unlike most MMP models, Bavaria
counts your local vote as a vote for a party, just as it counts your regional
vote. This reduces the scope for the “Berlusconi trick” that ruined Italy’s
system (running local candidates under a different party name than the regional
candidates, twin parties, one a clone of the other).
Some
people like the “best-runners-up” model used in the German province of
Baden-Wurttemberg: no regional candidates at all, no lists. The regional MPs
elected to top up the local results are the local candidates who, in that
region, got the most votes without winning the local seat.
The
effect of the Bavarian model is a hybrid with the best-runner-up model. You
have regional candidates, but those who did well locally without winning the
local seat have an advantage for the regional seat.
In the
2013 Bavarian election, of the 90 regional deputies, 13
were regional-only candidates who won election from regional votes alone, despite not
receiving any local votes. Four regional candidates standing at the head of the
regional list were not ranked first in the final count. (The regional candidates included all 977 local candidates -- an average of 11 in each riding -- plus 785 regional-only candidates, an average of 10 candidates from each party in each region.)
Bavaria’s
5% threshold rule applies to parties and “organized groups” such as the “Free
Voters” movement which denies it is a party, but has met the 5% threshold in
the last two elections. In 2008 it became the third party, with more seats than
the Greens, repeated in 2013.
The trend
to having two votes, now universal in Germany, began in Bavaria in 1949. They
wanted to let voters not only elect a local MP, but also express a preference
for one of the regional candidates of the party they were voting for.
One
reason Bavaria likes this system is that it tends to be as much of a one-party
province as Alberta used to be, so it needs competition within its conservative
party. The CSU governed in a liberal-conservative coalition in 2008-2013, but
otherwise has governed alone since 1962.
How big are the regions?
Bavaria’s
stable model has used seven regions since 1950, with an average of 23 MPs each.
Some are as small as 17 MPPs (9 local, 8 regional), while the largest region
(Munich) has 58 MPPs.
“I
support reforms to add elements of proportional representation that also ensure
that Members of Parliament remain directly accountable to their constituents”
said Dominic LeBlanc. “Do we want to keep that bond between a specific
MP and a specific group of Canadians?" asked Justin Trudeau. “Canadians voted for real change, for a
government that puts their needs ahead of the party's. A government that
celebrates our diversity, and not takes a divisive approach” said Minister Maryam Monsef.
The
regions have to be small and local enough to make that true, while still large
enough to be at least moderately proportional.
The mixed member proportional system used in Scotland and Wales, and
recommended for Canada by the Law Commission of Canada, has all MPs tied to
ridings or local regions; MPs would be elected in each riding but they'd be
augmented by regional MPs elected from candidates in a local region. Justin Trudeau
has never ruled that out at all, as long as the regions aren't too large.
Is
Bavaria’s regional ballot too large and complex? In 2003 the number of spoiled
or rejected votes was 1.2% for the local vote, 1.9% for the regional vote.
Munich, with 58 MPPs, had a ballot with 469 names. No wonder some were
rejected.
More details of Bavaria’s model
Bavaria
used to use the Scottish "highest average" (D'Hondt quota) but in
1990 this was declared unconstitutional, so they switched to "largest
remainder" (Hare). Wouldn't it be lovely to live in a country where lack
of full proportionality is unconstitutional?
Although
they use a 5% threshold for representation, they give state funding to any
party that reaches 1% of the regional votes.
Bavaria
has almost half their MPs elected from the regions. Canada would use a higher
ratio of local MPs.
Bavaria
originally imposed a 10% threshold at the regional level, but in 1973 opted for
a 5% threshold applicable to the whole province.
Bavaria’s
5% threshold rule has an unusual feature: a party needs to pass the 5%
threshold province-wide to win even a local seat; no independents. Canada would
never copy that feature.
Unlike
German federal elections, the ballot had no circle for the voter to mark after
the party name. If voters nevertheless marked the party name alone on the
regional ballot, it was counted as a valid vote for the party, but had no
effect on the ranking of the regional candidates. Only 1% of voters did this in
2013.
Update: the 2018 election:
How well did Bavaria’s open-list MMP system work in 2018?
They elected 205 MLAs: 91 directly elected, 114 regional top-ups elected
from open regional lists. The governing CSU lost their majority, and formed a coalition government with the centre-right “Free Voters.” This
was not simple, since the “Free Voters” had never whipped their members
votes, but now had to.
2018 results:
Christian
Social Union: 85 MLAs, all local (was 101 in 2013)
Greens:
38, 6 local, 32 regional (was 17)
Free
Voters: 27, all regional (was 17)
AfD:
22, all regional (was 0 – new party)
Social
Democrats: 22, all regional (was 42)
Liberals:
11, all regional (had been 0, below 5% threshold)
Of the 114 list seats, 31 were elected thanks to
voters moving them up the list, while 83 would have been elected with closed
lists.
Did the list-topper (first on the list) always get elected? Almost.
In the region of Lower Bavaria, the liberal FDP elected only 1 MLA, and he had
been second on their regional list.
One of the more unusual new Green MLAs is Paul
Knoblach, a 12th-generation Bavarian farmer. Knoblach was among the CSU’s
longtime supporters and had volunteered for its campaigns. But in 2018, at
age 64, he ran for the legislature for the first time. And he did it as a
Green. He was number 12 on the Green regional list for Lower Franconia, but he
got enough attention that the voters moved him up to 3rd place and into the
legislature.
Did the open lists hurt women? I did not check most
results, but the SPD zippers their lists, and I noticed in Upper Palatinate the
SPD elected 2 MLAs, list numbers 1 and 3 (two women). Conversely, in Middle
Franconia the SPD elected 4 MLAs: 1, 2, 3, and 5 (three men).
All CSU members were elected directly, no list seats.
Here are the details of three of the seven regions:
In Upper Palatinate:
3 Free Voter list seats: 1, 2, 4
2 AfD list seats: 1, 3
2 Green list seats: 1, 2
2 SPD list seats: 1, 3 (two women)
1 FDP list seats: 1
In
Lower Franconia:
3 Green seats: 1 direct (was #2 on list), 2 list seats
(1 and 12)
2 AfD seats: 1, 2
2 SPD list seats: 1, 2
2 Free Voter list seats: 1, 5 (5: Anna Stolz, lawyer, Mayor
of the City of Arnstein; had been elected Mayor in 2014 as the joint candidate
of the Greens, SPD, and Free Voters; the local Greens said they were very proud
of her as Mayor.)
1 FDP seat: 1
In Upper Bavaria (which includes Munich):
17 Green seats: 5 elected directly (they had been 1,
2, 5, 10, and 38 on the list) and 12 elected from the list: (3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
12, 13, 16, 22, 25, 36)
8 Free Voter list seats: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12 (12:
Hans Friedl, “a socially ecologically
liberal voice, an immigration law based on the Canadian model, no privatization
of the drinking water supply, a clear rejection of the privatization of
motorways” so the voters moved him up to #8)
7 SPD list seats: 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 14, 23
6 AfD list seats: 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 22
5 FDP list seats: 1, 2, 7, 13, 16
Canadian adaptations
As well
as allowing independents, Canada could need other changes to the Bavarian model.
We
would need smaller regions than they use.
They
use a 5% threshold province-wide for a party’s voters to elect a Regional MP.
The effective threshold for smaller regions would already be at least 5%. But
we might want some guarantee that a regional micro-party might not run in some
region of Ontario or Quebec and elect a single regional MP with only 1% of the vote in the province, if the public
expects this would not happen. A threshold of 4% or 5% applied
province-by-province would prevent this. In Europe, the threshold is generally
4% or 5%, and New Zealand has been debating which of these numbers to use.
Take
the Green Party in Quebec. With PR, assume their
vote doubles, to 4.4%. If Montérégie is a 12-MP region (excluding a couple of
ridings in Montérégie-est), and the Green vote doubled, Green voters there
would have cast enough votes to elect their star Quebec candidate JiCi Lauzon. The
same in 12-MP Montréal-est (deputy leader Daniel Green), in 11-MP Estrie—Mauricie—Centre-du-Q—Montérégie-est
(Corina Bastiani?) and someone in 13-MP Laval—Laurentides—Lanaudière. Four MPs,
just as they would deserve. A threshold of 4% lets them be elected, 5% does
not.
(Note: updated after 2018 election)
2 comments:
Very informative. I'm surprised Wilf that in your reference to the LCC report you didn't mention Belgium which is referred to in an end note rather than the main text itself. It seems to me if we (more likely the parties) want flexible lists rather than open lists like Bavaria has the Belgian (as well as other) model of a non-preferential single transferable vote mechanism based on a quota formula (in Belgium candidate & party votes divided by one more than the number of seats allocated to the party). That would definitely be more flexible than Sweden's system. The LCC report incidentally had the interesting notion of an open list that unlike in Bavaria candidate votes and party votes would be strictly separated with the former used strictly to rank candidates and the latter used strictly to allocate seats to the party. Interesting that the world's most widely used PR formula would be declared unconstitutional. But they would have been better off to follow New Zealand's lead and adopted pure Ste Lague. You know why...
Thank you very much for this.
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