Friday, November 30, 2012

Stéphane Dion’s choice of “Moderate Proportionality” merits consideration.

NOTE: I am keeping the post below on my blog to keep the link to Carey and Hix's study.)

Stéphane Dion’s new proposal reflects a broader discussion: the merits of “moderate proportionality.”
Dion proposes Swedish-style pure-list PR, but with smaller regions: voters elect between three and five MPs from multi-member districts. The standard would be five-member districts. A degree of proportionality, says Dion, “moderate enough to avoid a proliferation of parties and retain the possibility of a majority government formed by a single party.”
Moderate proportional models exist  
Dion is not the first to propose “moderate proportionality.” It exists in Spain, where voters elect 350 MPs from 50 multi-member districts averaging seven MPs each. It was proposed for the UK by the Jenkins Commission in 1998, which recommended a mixed proportional system with 80 regions having an average of 8.25 MPs each (some local, some regional top-up.) It was proposed for Quebec by Jean Charest’s government in 2004, when it recommended 27 regional districts, mostly with three single-member ridings and two regional MNAs. It was proposed for BC in 2004 by the BC Citizens Assembly, when it recommended a model that (after the Boundaries Commission designed the map) would have 20 districts returning a total of 85 MLAs.

The most recent academic advocates of “moderate proportionality” are Professors John Carey and Simon Hix (2009).

The “sweet spot”

They suggest a district magnitude “‘sweet spot’ in the four to eight range, where the most improvements in representativeness have already been realized but where the predicted party system fragmentation and government coalition complexity remain limited enough to allow voters to sort our responsibility for government performance and attribute credit and blame accordingly.”
They propose “low-magnitude Proportional Representation with districts in the six to eight range.” “Low-magnitude PR simultaneously fosters inclusiveness and limits the political unruliness high magnitudes invite via party system fragmentation and coalition complexity.” They find the combined probability of achieving good outcomes on all four of their variables “rises sharply moving from pure single-member districts through the low-magnitudes, peaks in the six to eight range, and then declines.” They specifically do not recommend districts as small as three. No country uses many such small districts except Ireland, and their last review concluded that the number of TDs representing a constituency should not be less than 4 unless the geographic size of such a constituency would be disproportionately large.
By contrast, the Law Commission of Canada has recommended a mixed member model “as inspired by the systems currently used in Scotland and Wales.” Scotland uses regions of 16 seats, Wales of 12. Regions of 14 seats give results twice as proportional as regions of seven seats, so many more voters can be represented by their first choice.
Districts with seven MPs at large would, under a pure-list model, mean districts containing 700,000 residents. While this might be acceptable in Canada’s nine largest metropolitan areas (which contain 51% of Canada’s population), the other 49% of us live in communities smaller than 700,000 people. Even a district magnitude of four MPs, with districts containing 400,000 residents, would only suit another 5% of us, since 44% of Canadians live in communities smaller than metropolitan Halifax’s 390,328.
Therefore, even a “moderate” model for Canada will need to be a mixed-member proportional system (known in Quebec as Mixed Compensatory), to maintain geographic representation.
A moderate MMP model
A moderate MMP model following Carey and Hix’s recommendations might have an average District Magnitude of about 7 Canada-wide; 7.1 in Quebec, 7.56 in Ontario, 6.8 in Alberta, and 7 in BC, in the new 338-MP House. Regions would mostly range from six MPs (four local, two regional compensatory), seven MPs (four local, three regional), eight MPs (five local, three regional), nine MPs (five local, four regional) or ten MPs (six local, four regional) with exceptional three-seaters in northern BC, northwestern Ontario and Saguenay, a four-seater for northern Nova Scotia, five-seaters in New Brunswick, South Alberta, Central Alberta and Northern Alberta, and an 11-seater in Toronto Centre.
Would this exclude, for example, Green Party voters? In 2008 when the Green Party’s vote across Canada peaked, a simulation using (as Dion does) the highest remainder calculation shows this model would have done well for Green voters: they would have elected 7 of the 9 Ontario MPs they deserved, 4 in Alberta and 4 in BC.
So, although it would be less proportional than the model recommended by the Law Commission of Canada, it would be a vast improvement over Canada’s winner-take-all system, for the very reasons Dion describes.

Projected Results 
What results would this “moderate” model produce, on the votes cast in 2011, in the new 338-MP House?
My simulation projects 145 Conservatives, 114 New Democrats, 60 Liberals, 14 Bloc, and 5 Greens. This is not quite the same as the results with perfect province-wide proportionality: 140 Conservative, 103 New Democrats, 64 Liberals, 18 Bloc, 13 Greens. That's because the smaller regions hurt the Liberals slightly. But it is a vast improvement on the projected results with Canada’s skewed winner-take-all system: 189 Conservative MPs, 108 NDP, 36 Liberals, 4 Bloc, and 1 Green. With 170 MPs needed for a majority government, an NDP-Liberal coalition would have 174 MPs.
What would Parliament look like, with a “moderately proportional” voting system?
Is “moderate proportionality” acceptable?
Fair Vote Canada prepared, in 2005, assessments of the models proposed for Quebec and BC. On Quebec, FVC said it “provides a very good foundation on which to build a fair voting system, but the current proposal must be greatly improved. With 14 regions instead of 27, a typical region could have six riding seats and four list seats. More seats per district will allow better proportionality, meaning that many more voters can be represented as they wish.” On BC, FVC endorsed BC-STV but “If BC-STV is adopted, we urge British Columbians to press for further improvements to increase proportionality and enhance diversity.” Evidently, Fair Vote Canada is not dogmatically opposed to ”moderate proportionality.”  However, with four regional list seats, parties would nominate at least five regional candidates in order to have a spare for cases of death or resignation of a sitting regional MP. Nominating five candidates is, from European experience, a good minimum to get better representation of women and minorities. So regions with fewer than four regional MPs could raise equity concerns.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Electoral Boundaries Commissions and proportional representation

Electoral Boundaries Commissions commonly hear some members of the public asking for a more proportional voting system, and reply that the voting system is outside their purview.

The Nova Scotia Commission recently commented on the topic:

"Electoral System Reform

Though it is not part of the Commission’s mandate to study electoral reform or to recommend changes to the current electoral system, there were a number of submissions on this topic in the public consultation process. Reforming the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system was suggested as a means of improving Nova Scotia’s representative democracy, by more accurately translating voter preferences into seats in the legislature. The distortions introduced by the current system, whereby only one member can be elected per constituency, with no allowance made for popular vote totals, can be a disincentive to political participation. This happens because all votes for losing candidates are, in effect, “thrown out,” and only those cast for the winning candidate in each riding count in terms of electing a representative. Some element of proportional representation is recommended as a means to “make every vote count.”

Another rationale for electoral system reform concerns the difficulty of ensuring minority representation under the FPTP system. As noted above, this has become clear in the current electoral redistribution process with regard to Acadian and African Nova Scotian representation. The same point could be made for the small number of women elected to the legislature. Comparative literature on this topic clearly shows that political systems using some form of proportional representation perform better than FPTP systems in terms of minority and female representation in elected legislatures. The use of party lists, quotas, designated seats, and other mechanisms in proportional systems largely accounts for these differences. As well, the dynamics of the system, which tend toward coalition building, would promote more co-operation and accommodation among parties in terms of the legislative agenda.

There appear to be significant democratic benefits to be gained from incorporating some measure of proportional representation into the current FPTP electoral system. This no doubt explains why this option has been recommended by commissions and assemblies in a number of provinces over the past decade. The most popular recommendation in Canada has been to replace the FPTP electoral system with some form of mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, which combines some of the advantages of the existing single-member constituencies with greater proportionality.

Recommendation
The Commission is aware that the serious consideration and recommendation of alternative electoral systems is beyond its mandate. It is also cognizant that the adoption of a new electoral system represents a dramatic change to one of Nova Scotia’s key political institutions. It therefore suggests that the Nova Scotia Legislature initiate a process involving both extensive critical examination and public consultation on the current electoral system as well as possible alternatives to it."

The belt of 11 ridings outside the GTA from Leeds—Grenville to Simcoe—Grey and Muskoka serves well to show the need. In the 2011 election Conservative votes cast 53% of those votes and elected 91% of those 11 MPs. NDP voters cast 21% and elected no one. Liberal voters cast 19% of those votes but, thanks to them being concentrated in Kingston, elected one MP. Green Party voters cast 5%. Under the model recommended by the Law Commission of Canada in 2004, with seven local MPs and four regional MPs, if Liberal voters still elected one local MP, the results would have been six local Conservative MPs, one local Liberal MP, 2 regional NDP MPs, one regional Liberal MP, and one regional Green MP (assuming the highest remainder calculation method).  The regional MPs for each party would have been the party’s regional candidates who got the most regional votes.

Will the current Federal Boundaries Commissions consider making a similar recommendation? We can always ask.

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Were most of the NDP’s 58 Quebec MPs “poteaux"?

Were most of the NDP’s new 58 Quebec MPs elected in 2011 “poteaux?” (Token candidates, or “fence posts” as they are called in Quebec.)

At the hugely attended remembrance yesterday for the late Patty Park, I ran into a respected NDP elder statesman, normally very knowledgeable, who had bought that media myth.

Other than Mulcair, those 58 were (with their ages on election day):

Eight Initial Stars (of which four were previous candidates)

Nycole Turmel, 68, a senior NDP and union activist for 20 years, past associate president (Labour) of the federal NDP, past president of PSAC, whom Jack Layton drafted out of semi-retirement to run in Hull-Aylmer (where Pierre Ducasse had run in 2008 and had won the Student Vote). Became Caucus Chair, then interim Leader, now Whip.

Former Liberal MP Françoise Boivin, 50, NDP candidate in 2008 (and won the Student Vote), lawyer, now shadow cabinet Justice Critic.

Romeo Saganash, 48, past Deputy Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, then Director of Quebec relations for it; now Shadow Cabinet critic for International Cooperation.

Alexandre Boulerice, 38, ran in 2008, a senior officer of Quebec NDP, communications adviser for the Quebec division of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, now Shadow Cabinet critic for Labour.

Robert Aubin, 50, local star in Trois-Rivières nominated well in advance, teacher, union rep for his high school. Became Critic for La Francophonie. Now associate critic for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

Guy Caron, 42, researcher and economist with CEP, the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union. He was president of the University of Ottawa Student Federation and became president of the Canadian Federation of Students in 1994, and has a Master's degree in economics. He was born and raised in Rimouski where he ran for the NDP in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011. Became Quebec Caucus Chair and Shadow Cabinet critic for Industry, now associate critic for Finance.

Raymond Côté, 44, ran in 2006 & 2008 in Quebec City area. President of the Parents Committee of the Capital School Board from 2005 to 2007, NDP spokesman in regional media, became Shadow Cabinet critic for Small Business and Tourism.


Tyrone Benskin, 52, National Vice President of ACTRA for 12 years and artistic director of Montreal's Black Theatre Workshop, became Shadow Cabinet critic for Canadian Heritage, now associate critic for Official Languages.

14 more previous candidates (of whom five are now in shadow cabinet)

Anne-Marie Day, 57, ran in 2008, was co-chair of the federal NDP Policy Committee. As President of the Regroupement des groupes de femmes de la Capitale-Nationale, she signed the first two agreements specifically related to the status of women in the Quebec capital region in 2006 and 2010. Master's degree in local and regional development, director of women's employment centre. Now Shadow Cabinet critic for Employment Insurance.

Hoang Mai, 38, ran in 2008 when he was treasurer of the Quebec wing of the party (and won the Student Vote); lawyer with a Master’s degree in law; born in Quebec of Vietnamese parents; soccer coach, elected in his home riding in a Montreal suburb. Now Shadow Cabinet critic for National Revenue.

François Lapointe, 40, project coordinator. Ran in 2009 by-election in Lower St. Lawrence region. Now Shadow Cabinet critic for Small Business and Tourism.

Philip Toone, 45, ran in 2000 & 2004, notary in Gaspésie. Deputy Whip; and Associate Critic for East Coast Fisheries and Oceans.

Christine Moore, 27, ran in 2006 and 2008. Was Medical Assistant in armed forces; “until the day before the election, I was working in a small health care centre as a clinical nurse in the intensive care unit and the emergency room” in her northern Quebec riding. Became Shadow Cabinet Critic for Military Procurement and National Defence (Associate Minister), now associate critic for National Defence.

Alain Giguère, 52, elected after running in 1984 and every election since 1993, Montreal tax lawyer. Associate critic for pensions.

Denis Blanchette, 54, ran in 2006 and 2008 in Quebec City (and won the Student Vote in 2008), computer analyst, public servant, now Associate Critic for Public Works and Government Services.

Anne Minh-Thu Quach, 28, ran in 2008. High School teacher, served three years on the regional teacher’s union executive committee and represented it on the general council of the central CSQ; born in Canada of Vietnamese parents. Now Associate Critic for Environment.

Alexandrine Latendresse, 27, ran in 2008, getting 5,252 votes against Quebec City Minister Josee Verner before defeating her in 2011. Worked for Guy Caron in Rimouski and for Mulcair in the 2007 by-election. A dedicated environmental activist, she worked as a naturalist at the Ecology Centre in Port-Au-Saumon. Has a degree in Russian Studies from Laval University, also studied Languages, History and Political Science at Moscow State University. Associate critic for Democratic Reform.

Francine Raynault, 66, ran in 2008 in Joliette. Since the federal riding of Joliette is 36% the City of Joliette, another 12% small towns, and 52% rural, she is the NDP’s only really rural Quebec MP (although Philip Toone's riding is less than half urban). A founding member of the Syndicat des agricultrices de Lanaudière, a founding member of the local section of the Union des producteurs agricoles, entrepreneur, executive secretary, farmer, property supervisor, real estate agent, union organiser. President of a regional seniors' group, and has eight grand-children. She was regional president and provincial vice-president of the feminist group AFEAS (Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale). Great-niece of Adhémar Raynault, mayor of Montréal (1936-1938, 1940-1944) and member of the National Assembly of Québec (1936-1939). Her partner (retired teacher Jacques Trudeau) was the NDP candidate in Joliette in 1979 (when still a student), 1980, 1981 (byelection), 1984 in a different riding, 1997 in Joliette, 2004 and 2006. Far from an accidental MP. Raynault got 47.3% against the 34% of Pierre Paquette, so she was a giant-killer: Paquette was House Leader and Duceppe's heir-apparent, but eventually declined to run to replace him.

François Pilon, 52, ran in 2004, 2006, 2008, union local vice-president in Montreal for seven years.

François Choquette, 37, ran in 2006, adult education teacher in Drummondville, has a master’s degree in literature and has been the director of multicultural theatre troupe.

Jonathan Tremblay, 26, ran in 2008 in his home riding in Quebec City area, brickmason.

Jean Rousseau, 49, ran in 2008 in his home riding in Sherbooke area (and won the Student Vote), industrial relations counsellor and minor hockey coach. Now Shadow Cabinet critic for Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec.

12 Credible new candidates now in Shadow Cabinet

Sadia Groguhé, 48, was a municipal councillor in France from 1995 to 2000, and anticipated becoming an MP there. Born in Marseille (France) to Algerian parents, arrived in Canada in 2005. She has a master's degree in psychology and works as a guidance counselor. Deputy House Leader, and associate critic for Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism.

Hélène Leblanc, 53, agronomist and project manager, was teacher and museum guide, candidate for Projet Montreal for borough councillor. Now Shadow Cabinet critic for Industry; was Critic for Science and Technology.

Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet, 55, Archaeologist and museum guide in Montreal, co-founder of her union, union officer, M.A. (Anthropology). Now Shadow cabinet Critic for Housing, previously for Skills Development.

Pierre Dionne Labelle, 55, was President of the Association des artistes de la musique et du spectacle Laurentides; active in anti-poverty group, columnist. Native of Saint-Jérôme where he still lives, in the riding of Rivière-du-Nord (where the NDP won the Student Vote in 2008). Shadow cabinet Critic for Francophonie, previously associate critic for CRTC, Copyright and Digital Issues. “I have a bump here that dates back to the first lockout I took part in at Commonwealth Plywood some 30 years ago.”

Marie-Claude Morin, 26, a community development coordinator in Saint-Hyacinthe, and an actress (with a diploma in theatre). Shadow Cabinet Critic for Housing, and Chair of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women.

Mathieu Ravignat, 38, MA in political science, ran in his home riding of Pontiac (where the NDP won the Student Vote in 2008), worked for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council focusing on aboriginal and environmental issues. Shadow Cabinet critic for Treasury Board, previously for Public Works and Government Services, previously associate critic for International Trade.

Hélène Laverdière, 56, Foreign-service officer, Ph.D. Critic for Americas and Consular Affairs.

Matthew Dubé 23, ran in his home riding of Chambly--Borduas, was president of Quebec Young New Democrats and co-president of McGill NDP, BA in political science and history, volunteer coach for local hockey and soccer teams. Now shadow cabinet critic for Sports, was associate critic for Post-secondary Education.

Lysane Blanchette-Lamothe, 27, an accidental MP but was a native of her riding (so not really a "poteau") in West Montreal, Pierrefonds--Dollard (where the NDP won the Student Vote in 2008), campaigned minimally by commuting from Trois-Rivieres where she was doing a Master’s degree and working in a community-based organization that advocates to help people living in poverty improve their quality of life. Now Shadow Cabinet Critic for Seniors, previously associate critic for seniors.

Pierre Nantel, 47, researcher and commentator at TVA and Radio-Canada, worked with Cirque du Soleil for twenty years. Nominated the previous year, in a Longueuil nomination contested by Dr. Djaouida Sellah. Was critic for Sport (Minister of State), now Shadow Cabinet critic for Canadian Heritage.

Manon Perreault, 45, was a municipal councillor for seven years, trainer and administrator. Shadow Cabinet critic for Persons with Disabilities.

Claude Patry, 57, president of large Alcan union local in Saguenay, became Shadow Cabinet critic for Employment Insurance.

17 more credible new candidates

Jonathan Genest-Jourdain, 31, lawyer, Innu band member, municipal candidate in 2009 in Sept-Iles, ran in home riding on remote north shore of Gulf of St. Lawrence. Now associate critic for Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development.

Paulina Ayala, 48, teacher, first Chilean woman elected to the House of Commons; fought in Chile for democracy and respect for human rights, a leader in the student movement and in citizens’ rights organizations under the Pinochet dictatorship, immigrated to Canada in 1995. Became shadow cabinet Critic for Americas (Minister of State), now Associate critic.

Dr. Djaouida Sellah, of Algerian origins coming to Canada in 1998, President of the Quebec Association of Doctors Graduated outside Canada and the United States, and co-president of the Quebec NDP Women's Committee. Elected in the south shore suburb of Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert (where the NDP won the Student vote in 2008.) Associate critic for health.

Tarik Brahmi, 42, born in Lyon (France) of Algerian ancestry, came to Quebec in 2002, engineer, active environmentalist, public servant. Ran for municipal council in 2009. Ran in home riding of Saint-Jean south of Montreal (where the NDP won the Student Vote in 2008), says he was elected MP despite his "Arabic name, his French accent and his baldness.” Became associate critic for Consumer Protection.

Sylvain Chicoine, 40, ran in his home riding. Security officer, worked two days a week for the union for security guards for six years, member of the union executive. Became associate critic for Public Safety, now for Veterans Affairs.

Jamie Nicholls, 40, ran in home riding, owner at Jamie Nicholls Landscape Architects, first joined the NDP at age 18 and worked on Mulcair's last two campaigns. Associate critic for Natural Resources, previously for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

Annick Papillon, 30, journaIist and public servant, from a political family in Quebec City region where she ran (her father was the campaign organizer for her Liberal opponent). Associate critic for Consumer Protection, previously for Veterans Affairs.

Dany Morin (Chicoutimi-LeFjord), 25, chiropractor, ran in his home riding, associate critic for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Issues.

Ève Péclet, 22, law graduate, an impressive head-table presenter at the Vancouver convention, organized Amnesty International group while in high school, joined the NDP at age 18, worked in previous campaigns, her uncle had been an NDP candidate, she always thought of becoming an MP one day, Amnesty International Chairperson at law school, campaigned in her riding. Now associate critic for Foreign Affairs.

Rosane Doré Lefebvre, 26, joined party four years earlier, environmental activist with a degree in political science and geography, ran in her home riding, was a retail shop assistant about to begin Masters in Environmental Management, was a Master of Ceremonies at the 2012 leadership convention, now associate critic for Public Safety.

Pierre-Luc Dusseault, 19, president of university NDP club, ran in his home riding. Now Chair, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pierre Jacob, 58, ran in his home riding, college teacher and lawyer, retired criminologist, member of Quebec NDP Environment Committee.

Marc-André Morin (Laurentides-Labelle), 60, ran in his home riding where he is editor of a Citizens’ Journal, born in the Laurentide region to a politically active family, claims not to be a political neophyte having been involved fighting locally to preserve trail areas from development.

Réjean Genest, 65, ran in his home riding, a gardener for 40 years, has written on horticultural and agricultural issues for 12 years, has produced the website lesbeauxjardins.com, taught organic agriculture in a school of herbology, has travelled throughout Quebec as a judge for the Villes, Villages et Campagnes flower contest for 15 years.

Isabelle Morin (Notre-Dame-de-Grace–Lachine), 27, high school teacher of French language education and drama at a school in the riding, President of the NDP Youth Caucus, cyclist and transit advocate.

Élaine Michaud, 25, a public servant in the Quebec City region where she was elected, campaigned in the riding. She calls herself a « career politician » because she has been an active NDP volunteer since age 18.

José Nunez-Melo, 54, Quebec public servant, Steward of the Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec, publisher. Born and raised in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, where he was administrator of a large hotel complex in Puerto Plata. Immigrated to Canada in 1990 and earned a Bachelor’s degree in management.

7 Talented “poteaux” (one of whom is now in Shadow Cabinet)

Charmaine Borg, 20, McGill NDP co-president, was labour relations officer for the Association of McGill University Support Employees. Franco-Ontarian, in 2008 received the Ontario Lieutenant Governor’s Community Volunteer Award for founding a drama program for at-risk youth. Shadow Cabinet critic for Copyright and Digital Issues. Did not campaign in her suburban riding.

Laurin Liu, 21, co-president of Quebec Young New Democrats, was Vice-President of Internet Communications, founded NDP club in CEGEP, McGill NDP officer, parachuted into suburban Rivière-des-Mille-Îles. Became associate critic for Environment, now for Science and Technology. Did not campaign in her riding.

Ruth Ellen Brosseau, 27, “Vegas”; did not campaign. Has flourished and excelled in her accidental role, and is now associate critic for Agriculture.

Mylène Freeman, 22, was Projet Montreal candidate for councillor in Outremont, parachuted into Argenteuil--Papineau—Mirabel, research assistant, editorial assistant, president of NDP McGill, Franco-Ontarian. Did not campaign in her riding.

Jean-François Larose, 39, parachuted into a suburban riding. Was Vice-President of his union local.

Sana Hassainia, 36, did not campaign in her riding. Came from Tunisia to Canada in 2000, got Master’s in French Literature and Language in Tunisia, has a certificate in Journalism from the University of Montreal, has been an Editor, French teacher, printer, project leader, radio host. Was three months pregnant at her election, gave birth to a son on 14 November 2011. In February, 2012, brought her three-month-old son, Skander-Jack, into the chamber for a vote related to the abolition of the long-gun registry.

Lise St-Denis, 71, ran in 2008 in her home riding, retired teacher, parachuted into Saint Maurice in 2011 as a “poteau,” an unhappy accidental MP who then joined the Liberals.

Monday, August 20, 2012

My response to Stéphane Dion


My response to Stéphane Dion


Thank you for mentioning my simulation in your speech to the Green Party Saturday.


Your speech was persuasive, and obviously well-received.


I was very interested in your comment that, under the recommendations of the Law Commission of Canada, “The number of candidates per party included on these lists would vary immensely, from just one in Prince Edward Island to about a dozen for some regions in Quebec and Ontario. This would effectively divide Canada up into several political microclimates. I would find that worrisome.”


So would I. Luckily, that was NOT what the Law Commission recommended. That was only their “demonstration model,” an example of how the calculations worked. For this purpose they had to use large regions because they used the 2000 election results. In Quebec in 2000 the PC Party got only 5.6% of the vote for three list seats, and the Canadian Alliance got only 6.2% for four list seats. Dividing Quebec into five regions of about 15 seats each would have largely excluded those parties. The same for the NDP in Alberta, if Alberta was split in two.


But the Law Commission said “adding an element of proportionality to Canada’s electoral system, as inspired by the systems currently used in Scotland and Wales, would be the most appropriate model for adoption.” Scotland has 16-MP regions. Wales has 12-MP regions. The Law Commission’s actual recommendation left the size of the regions open.


And they recommended “5. Within the context of a mixed member proportional system, Parliament should adopt a flexible list system that provides voters with the option of either endorsing the party “slate” or “ticket,” or of indicating a preference for a candidate within the list.” Those sample very large regions would have meant “bed-sheet ballots.”


That is why Prof. Henry Milner’s presentation of the Law Commission model used five regions in Quebec, seven in Ontario, two in Alberta, and two in BC.

He presented this at an electoral reform conference Feb. 21, 2009, in Toronto sponsored by Fair Vote Canada. As you will see, all across Canada the regions average 14 or 15 MPs. Of course, in the four Atlantic provinces they average, of necessity, 8 MPs. That is not an immense variation, nor a micro-climate.

My main concern with your model is that it will not pass a referendum in the 55% of Canada where communities have a single MP.

In Quebec it will be more acceptable because Quebeckers are accustomed to your 17 administrative regions. Ontario is not so lucky. We have 14 health regions, 31 public school boards, and no consensus on regions.


Between the GTA and Ottawa are nine single-MP-community ridings who will not like your model. Northern Ontario has nine ridings; seven of them will not like it. (Thunder Bay might like a northwestern three-seater.)  Sarnia, Chatham, St. Thomas, Muskoka, Orillia, Midland, Collingwood, the Bruce Peninsula, Stratford, Oxford, Cambridge, Guelph, Orangeville, and many other such communities will reject it.  If you insist on five-MP districts, even Charest’s mixed compensatory model with five MNAs (three local, two compensatory) would be more acceptable in single-MP communities.


My other concern is the high threshold of about 15%.


No, I do not insist on pure proportionality. On the 2008 votes, Milner’s model gave the Greens 18 MPs, not the 21 which province-wide proportionality would have given them. The NDP was short two, the Liberals got a bonus of two, and the Bloc got a bonus of three. That’s okay. In the UK, the Jenkins Commission recommended regions averaging eight MPs. That’s a high threshold, but not as high as your 15%. But you would not propose a region of eight MPs at large, because it is not local enough in most regions outside Montreal.


So I still think only a mixed compensatory model will suit Canada.


A moderate model is better than nothing. The NDP likes a 5% threshold, which the Greens can live with. I can see the Liberal Party and the NDP agreeing on a moderate model in 2015. For example, with Alberta’s new 34 ridings, metropolitan Calgary and Edmonton could each be 11-MP regions (7 local, 4 compensatory), and the rest of Alberta 12 MPs (eight local, four compensatory). 


But I am sure you know that the Turkish 10% threshold, which they adopted to keep out the Kurdish party, is regarded in Europe as undemocratic. You do not want to be in such company, do you?  


(One point Dion made, I agree with. He says “People like Elizabeth May on Vancouver Island and Ralph Goodale in Regina would have probably garnered more votes for the Greens and the Liberals.” In my previous post I said “In Dion’s model, due to his small districts, I calculate the results as 128 Conservatives, 115 NDP, 47 Liberals, 18 Bloc, 0 Green. . . . Dion's "moderate" model might be good for the Greens after all, if they got more votes.” So I agree Elizabeth May and Ralph Goodale would very likely have won, making 128 Conservatives, 113 NDP, 48 Liberals, 18 Bloc, and 1 Green.)

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Ontario municipalities need Local Choice

Ontario municipalities have almost no choice in how its citizens elect local councils.

Take Toronto. It elects a mayor by winner-takes-all city-wide, and 44 councillors in 44 single-member wards, by winner-takes-all, with single councillors each claiming to represent all 60,000 residents of their ward.  The worst voting system in Canada? Not as bad as Vancouver City Council, where 600,000 residents elect ten councillors city-wide by winner-takes-all-ten, so a winning municipal group can elect all ten councillors.

The Local Choice campaign, which all reformers support, wants all Ontario municipalities to have freedom to choose their voting system, whether they choose a winner-takes-all system or a proportional system. It says “Ontario’s municipal elections often suffer from low levels of participation, low turnover and poor representation of women, visible minorities and tenants.”

Living outside Toronto, I don’t know what is the best municipal voting system for Toronto. But I can try to be objective on the possibilities for democratic change that would reflect Toronto’s diversity.

As a world-class city, Toronto’s Councillors need to be aware of the diverse range of alternatives. If Fair Vote Toronto can educate City Councillors to understand the diverse options, that’s a win.

For mayor, Toronto could keep electing one city-wide (with hideously expensive campaigns), by First-Past-The-Post. Or they could change to the Alternative Vote (Instant Runoff Vote). This can still leave you with a dysfunctional result, a mayor and Council at loggerheads. Look at London, with a Council elected by proportional representation, and a mayor by AV (IRV): somehow they got a conservative mayor (Boris Johnson) and a left-majority council.

Or Toronto could have council choose the mayor. In the UK, most mayors are chosen by council, but a few like London’s are elected city-wide. This year, 10 English cities voted by referendum on city-wide elections of mayors; only one voted for that model.

For council, Toronto could stay with 44 single-member wards, with a single councillor for each 60,000 residents, no separate borough councils, and one person claiming to speak for everyone in the ward. That’s not very local, for a local government.

Berlin has been, for 100 years, the laboratory for democracy.  It has 141 representatives, one for each 25,000 residents, and 12 boroughs with 55 part-time councillors each, one for each 5,300 residents. Of course they are all elected by proportional representation.  For the boroughs, there is no threshold:  with 5,300 supporters (2% of the vote) you can start your own party and get elected.

Other large world cities use STV, the proportional Single-Transferable Vote. Glasgow has 79 councillors (one for each 7,500 residents) in 21 wards (with 28,000 residents in each ward). Dublin has 52 councillors (one for each 9,750 residents) in 11 wards (with 46,000 residents in each ward); six of the 52 were elected as independents. Belfast has 51 councillors (one for each 5,300 residents) in nine wards (each with 30,000 residents).  Wellington, New Zealand’s third-largest city, uses STV, with no municipal parties. It has 14 councillors (one for each 14,300 residents) in five wards (each with 40,000 residents).

You can see the problem: all these cities have far fewer residents per councillor than the Toronto megacity has.

Toronto could go to full STV with five-member wards, for maximum representation of diversity; it takes only 16.7% of the vote to win a seat. In Toronto, with only 44 councillors, that means the world’s largest municipal STV wards, with 290,000 residents in each ward. If Vancouver went to two five-member STV wards with 300,000 residents in each, that would be a definite improvement. (Note: Australia elects its Senate by province-wide STV, so they would still hold the record for largest STV constituency.)

Or if Toronto wants better representation for its diversity without such large wards, they could go back to the two-member wards the old Toronto City had for a century until 1985. That way, at least you have competing councillors, from wards the same size as a provincial riding. Or Toronto could use the “cumulative vote:” voters have two votes and can give them both to the same candidate if they wish. A cumulative voting election permits voters in an election for more than one seat to put more than one vote on a preferred candidate. When voters in the minority concentrate their votes in this way, it increase their chances for obtaining representation in a legislative body. As of March 2012, more than fifty communities in the United States use cumulative voting, all resulting from cases brought under the National Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Or Toronto could go to the “limited vote”  or "Single Non-Transferable Vote:" voters have only one vote, but two diverse councillors, each representing a different group of voters. Did you know Ontario elections allowed the limited vote for Toronto's three MPPs from 1885 to 1894? Voters had two votes, three to be elected. The idea was to get a Liberal elected in Tory Toronto, until a Labour candidate almost won. The limited vote was the favourite semi-proportional system in the British Empire before 1914, even used in Calcutta municipal districts to let Muslims elect some councillors.

Or Toronto could go to STV with two-member wards.

Or Toronto could follow one of the recommendations of Paul Bedford, a longtime Toronto planner. He presents two schemes for at-large district seats in Toronto. The first is for 22 wards and 4 districts with 22 at-large councillors (5 or 6 each). The second is for 33 wards and four districts with 11 at-large councillors (2 or 3 each). (New Brunswick's two largest cities, Saint John and Moncton, both have the same Council structure: a mayor, two at-large councillors, and eight ward councillors, two from each of four wards, total ten councillors plus a mayor.)

If they want to stay with single-member wards elected by winner-take-all, they have to decide between FPTP and AV/IRV: which one will give better representation to Toronto’s diversity?

Perhaps a world-class city should have the world’s largest wards? Or perhaps Toronto needs to start by re-examining the megacity?

But they can’t use most of these options without the Ontario government giving them more choice.

Ontario’s Municipal Elections Act says “An elector is entitled to vote for as many candidates for an office as there are members to be elected to that office, but only once for each candidate. The elector shall make a cross or other mark on the ballot, within the space designated for the marking of the ballot to the right of the name of each candidate for whom the elector wishes to vote. ” The City of Toronto Act lets council divide or redivide the City into wards or dissolve the existing wards, but otherwise “the members of council shall be elected in accordance with the Municipal Elections Act, 1996” and “the head of council shall be elected by general vote.”

The Local Choice Statement:


“Ontario’s municipal elections often suffer from low levels of participation, low turnover and poor representation of women, visible minorities and tenants.

While cities and towns across North America are using innovative methods to make their local elections more participatory, diverse and fair, our cities and towns in Ontario are severely restricted by the Municipal Elections Act.

We propose that municipalities be given more choice, allowing them to customise their local elections based on local needs. Each Ontario municipality is unique and there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution.

We call on the Ontario government to create enabling legislation that gives more choice to Ontario’s municipalities while also laying down parameters to regulate any moves towards reform.

The legislation would provide new regulations for tools such as runoff voting, municipal parties, single transferable vote, pre-election contribution disclosure, weekend voting, neighbourhood borough councils or others.

No municipality should be forced to change its system and we are not advocating for any specific reform. This legislation would simply provide local Councils with options, enabling them to open the door to local democratic renewal and to choose the system that best fits the unique needs of their community.”

Sunday, May 20, 2012

Stéphane Dion is right: the Alternative Vote Would Not Help Canada

Stéphane Dion says:

“Our voting system weakens Canada’s cohesion. It artificially amplifies the regional concentration of political party support at the federal level. With 50% of the vote in a given province, a federal party could end up taking almost all the seats. But with 20% of the vote, it may end up not winning any seats at all. This is how Ontario appeared more Liberal than it really was, Alberta more Reform-Conservative, Quebec more Bloc, etc.

Exaggerated regional differences

Dion says “This regional amplification effect benefits parties with regionally concentrated support and, conversely, penalizes parties whose support is spread across the country without dominating anywhere. A party able to reach out to voters across the country is disadvantaged compared to another whose base is only in one region.

“I do not see why we should maintain a voting system that makes our major parties appear less national and our regions more politically opposed than they really are. I no longer want a voting system that gives the impression that certain parties have given up on Quebec, or on the West.”

Preferential voting (AV/IRV) won’t help

The Liberal Party of Canada voted in January 2012 to support preferential voting (also known as the Alternative Vote, or Instant Runoff Vote). However, Dion now says “Preferential voting . . . does nothing to correct the distortion between votes and seats and the under-representation of national parties compared to regional ones. Other changes are needed to find a voting system that best fits the Canadian context.”

So I checked the 2011 election results to see if Dion is right. On the votes cast in May 2011, would preferential voting (the “Alternative Vote” or “Instant Runoff Vote”) do anything to fix the problems he's dismayed by?


To get voters’ second preferences, I used the EKOS poll of “which party would be your second choice” taken April 28-30, 2011.

Justin Trudeau and Marc Garneau would have lost

Liberal voters in Quebec are under-represented. They elected only seven MPs, not the 11 MPs their voters deserved.

AV/IRV would have cut them down to five MPs. Justin Trudeau and Marc Garneau would have lost to the NDP, thanks to Bloc and Green voters’ second choices.

Conservative voters in Quebec are under-represented. They elected only five MPs, not the 12 or 13 their voters deserved.

AV/IRV would have cut them down to four MPs. Jacques Gourde would have lost to the NDP, thanks to second choices of Bloc and Liberal voters. 

That’s because AV hurts third parties, and in Quebec, the Conservatives and Liberals have become the third parties.

Liberal voters in the West are badly under-represented, where they elected only four MPs, not the 11 MPs their voters deserved. According to my spreadsheet, would AV have let them elect more MPs?

Not in BC: second choices would not make any BC seat change hands.

Nor in Alberta: same result.

Not in Saskatchewan, although Liberal and Green second choices would have elected NDP candidate Noah Evanchuk in Palliser.

In Manitoba NDP second choices would have let Anita Neville hold onto Winnipeg South Centre.

In provinces where we already saw three-way races, AV would make a few seats change hands.

Stéphane Dion is right

But as to his very justified concern, exaggerated regional differences, Stéphane Dion is right: AV would do nothing to help. In fact, it would hurt more than it would help.

Dion says "There are also Conservatives in Quebec, traditionally "blue," particularly in the regions, who are entitled to be heard. Despite my Liberal allegiance, I am convinced that the general interest requires that Quebec’s Conservatives be able to make their full contribution to the building of Canada alongside Conservatives from elsewhere in Canada.
I want a federal voting system that fully honours Quebec’s rich political culture, of which we are rightfully proud."

But he is right: AV will not do this. It's not even a step in the right direction; ask Jacques Gourde.

Monday, May 7, 2012

Stéphane Dion’s new proposal for electoral reform:

Stéphane Dion is clear as to the need for Proportional Representation. He has launched an opening gambit in what should become a serious discussion among the opposition parties about voting reform.

NOTE: This blog post is out of date, of historical interest only. My current comments on Dion's model are Stéphane Dion's moderately proportional P3 model: how well would it work?


The following is my out of date post:

Dion says:

“Our voting system weakens Canada’s cohesion. For Canada, the main problem of this distortion effect is that it artificially amplifies the regional concentration of political party support at the federal level. With 50% of the vote in a given province, a federal party could end up taking almost all the seats. But with 20% of the vote, it may end up not winning any seats at all. This is how Ontario appeared more Liberal than it really was, Alberta more Reform-Conservative, Quebec more Bloc, etc. During all the years that the Bloc dominated Quebec’s representation in the House of Commons, they never received a majority of votes from Quebec.

“This regional amplification effect benefits parties with regionally concentrated support and, conversely, penalizes parties whose support is spread across the country without dominating anywhere. A party able to reach out to voters across the country is disadvantaged compared to another whose base is only in one region.

“My main concern with all this is national cohesiveness, even national unity. I do not see why we should maintain a voting system that makes our major parties appear less national and our regions more politically opposed than they really are, favouring regional parties at the expense of national ones concerned with reconciling the regional interests of our vast country. I no longer want a voting system that gives the impression that certain parties have given up on Quebec, or on the West. On the contrary, the whole spectrum of parties, from Greens to Conservatives, must embrace all the regions of Canada. In each region, they must covet and be able to obtain seats proportionate to their actual support. This is the main reason why I recommend replacing our voting system.

“. . . Thus, seats would be truly up for grabs in all ridings, even in the most Conservative ones in Alberta and the most Liberal ones in Toronto and Montreal.
 



"Canada is a diverse country. So in the interest of national cohesion, it is preferable that national parties not be at a disadvantage compared to those with most of their support lying in a single region.


". . there are many other voting systems. In fact, ours is far from being the preferred method in other democracies. It can hardly be found anywhere except for the United States and the United Kingdom (but not in Scotland or Wales).

Seats do not match votes

Dion notes “the major problem with this voting system: the way it distorts the results between votes and seats. This distortion is often significant, creating enormous gaps between the number of seats won by the parties and the number of votes received. There are even times when the party that won the most seats and formed the government did not even receive the most votes. This has occurred in the provinces (three times in mine) and in the 1979 federal election.

“This distortion effect is particularly difficult to accept when a majority government elected by a minority of voters forces the country on an ideological course that is contrary to the preferences of the majority.

“Sometimes, this distortion effect ends up depriving the opposition parties of enough seats to be able to function properly. In one instance in New Brunswick, the opposition did not win a single seat!

“Canada is a diverse country. So in the interest of national cohesion, it is preferable that national parties not be at a disadvantage compared to those with most of their support lying in a single region.

“Of all the democracies, Canada’s Parliament is one where women are not as well represented as they should be. We need a voting system that helps correct this under-representation and promotes adequate minority representation.

“Like so many other democracies, Canada has seen a drop in voter participation in the last few years. A new voting system is required to help us curb this rise in abstentions.


“Preferential voting is a step in the right direction.” But he explained this at the Fair Vote Canada Conference May 26: it is a foot in the door within the Liberal Party to start the discussion on electoral reform. He knows preferential voting has never led to proportional representation anywhere in the world.

Dion is open to other formulas

"I may not have come up with the best formula, and I do keep an open mind. However, it is in this spirit that we need to work to improve our democracy. . . My hope is that the LPC, and all other political parties on Canada’s federal scene, will one day adopt these views, if not the proposition that I submit for discussion."

These points are more important than the details of his unusual model.

Dion’s model: Swedish-style list PR with small regions

Dion advocates Swedish-style list PR, but with small regions like Spain's but even smaller. You elect between three and five MPs from multi-member districts, with some exceptions like northern seats, but generally, as close to five as possible.

He wants open lists like Sweden, and with small regions this would be very feasible. You would have two votes: one for a party, one for a candidate on the party list.

Also, he wants voters to rank the parties with a preferential ballot. Not STV, where a surplus is transferred; just preferential. A party would be dropped from the count in favour of your second choice party if it didn't get enough votes to elect someone in your small district.

He writes “It would produce a fairly meaningful proportional representation that greatly reduces the distortion between votes and seats as well as regional amplification, but at the same time is moderate enough to avoid a proliferation of parties and retain the possibility of a majority government formed by a single party.”
Let’s see if that is true.

1.     The regional amplification effect continues

Liberal voters in the West have been robbed of their voice by winner-take-all for 40 years. Last May the four western provinces elected 72 Conservatives, 15 New Democrats, only four Liberals, and one Green. A normal proportional system, such as the one recommended by the Law Commission of Canada, would have let Western voters, on the votes cast in 2011, elect 51 Conservatives, 26 New Democrats, 11 Liberals, and four Greens.

I did a simulation with Dion’s model on the votes cast last May, with 73 districts as close to five as local geography allows. (My projection is based on the second choice data from an EKOS poll taken April 28-30, 2011.) In the West, Dion’s model would have helped the top two parties, not the Liberals: 57 Conservatives, 30 New Democrats, only five Liberals, and no Greens at all, not even Elizabeth May on the votes actualy cast in 2011 (but she would have attracted more regional votes).

Dion writes “Despite my Liberal allegiance, I am convinced that the general interest requires that Quebec’s Conservatives be able to make their full contribution to the building of Canada alongside Conservatives from elsewhere in Canada.” Yet he proposes a model which, in his small districts, on the votes cast in 2011 would likely have elected only one more Conservative MP, 6 MPs, instead of the 12 their vote share should give them. Conservative voters in Greater Montreal were especially silenced by winner-take-all: zero MPs when they deserved four. Dion’s model would give Greater Montreal Conservatives only one MP.

Liberal voters in Quebec were also robbed last May: they elected only seven MPs, when their vote share deserved 11. Dion’s model would have given Quebec Liberals only one more MP. But Quebec’s second party, the Bloc, would have flourished: 18 MPs.

2.     Why not MMP?

Dion sets up pure proportional representation with no regions (Netherlands and Israel) as a straw man – “I would prefer to keep our voting system rather than adopt pure proportional representation” – while never once mentioning the Mixed Member Proportional option recommended by the LawCommission of Canada, by the Charest government in Quebec in 2005, by the New Democratic Party, by the Mouvement pour une démocratie nouvelle, and by Dion himself in 2006.

Back in 2006 he favoured the Mixed Member Proportional system, with two-thirds of the seats being elected as they are now and a further one-third compensatory (top-up) seats with a five percent threshold in every province, very like the Law Commission.

Dion notes the advantages of having a local MP with “a riding where they were elected, to which they are accountable and on which they depend for their re-election.” But only 45% of Canadians live in cities as big as Regina, Saskatchewan which has 193,000 people.

Yet Dion proposes a model which would deprive 55% of Canadians, those who live in single-MP communities, of a local MP, unlike the Law Commission’s model.

Dion notes that, in the Netherlands and Israel, “voters lose “their” MP and “their” riding. They vote only for party lists.” Again, he never mentions that the Law Commission’s model lets voters vote both for a local MP and for a candidate on a regional list, not just for a list. And he never explains why he has changed his mind.

3.     Small districts.

If we had used province-wide totals with full proportionality the results on the votes cast in 2011 would have been 126 Conservative, 94 New Democrats, 59 Liberals, 18 Bloc, 11 Greens.

In Dion’s model, due to his small districts, I calculate the results as 128 Conservatives, 115 NDP, 47 Liberals, 18 Bloc, 0 Green (but likely 1 Green, and likely 1 more Liberal).

He says “The party that gets the most votes in a riding would probably win three seats out of five or two out of three.” Indeed, based on the votes cast in 2011, I project more than half of the 73 districts – 44 districts – elect members of only two parties. In 20 three-seaters, we find a 2:1 result 19 times out of 20. In 18 four-seaters, only seven are divided between three parties. Even in the 34 five-seaters, 13 of them elect members of only two parties, and the party with the most votes wins at least three out of five seats 59% of the time.

Dion says his model is “moderate enough to avoid a proliferation of parties and retain the possibility of a majority government formed by a single party.” Indeed; it favours the top two parties.

Dion’s preferential ballot would help Liberal voters in Ontario, letting them elect them 11 more MPs, still five less than they deserved. Yet Dion’s model would cost Liberal voters four MPs in other provinces, compared with who they elected last May. Not even one from Saskatchewan; even in a Regina-Estevan five-seater on the votes cast in 2011 the Liberal Party would have been eliminated after the second count with 0.85 quota.(Except that Ralph Goodale would no doubt have attracted more votes from the wider area, still winning a seat.) One less in Nova Scotia, one less in Newfoundland and Labrador, and one less in PEI. Only one Liberal MP from Alberta. Only one more from Quebec, one more from Manitoba, one more from New Brunswick, one from the Yukon, and one from Labrador.

Not even one Green MP. Vancouver Island has six MPs, which have to be two three-seaters. Dion uses the Droop quota. In a Victoria three-seater the quota calculation would have been:

New Democrats 1.35 quotas
Conservatives 1.34 quotas
Greens 0.92 quotas
Liberals 0.39 quotas

After the Liberals’ second choices, we get:
New Democrats 1.56 quotas
Conservatives 1.39 quotas
Greens 0.97 quotas

 
But Dion’s model then eliminates the Greens, making the final count:
New Democrats 1.86 quotas
Conservatives 1.53 quotas

So the three MPs for Victoria would have been two NDP, one Conservative, on the votes cast in 2011. (In reality, May would have attracted more votes from the rest of Victoria, and would have still been elected.)

Charest's 2005 Quebec proposal

This is not the first time a Liberal in Quebec has proposed a "moderate" small-region model. It's what Charest's government proposed in 2005. He proposed an MMP model with five-MNA regions (three local, two regional.) Except in rural areas it would be three-MNAs (two local, one regional.) Pretty similar.

They held public hearings in 2005-6, by a joint committee: a Select Committee of the National Assembly sitting together with an 8-member Citizens' Committee (an excellent consultation model, by the way.)

The superb Report of the Citizens' Committee reflected the public reaction: such a small-region model was not sufficiently proportional to "reflect the diversity of ideas that exist in Quebec society." "In concrete terms, the actual threshold for entry into the National Assembly could be between 13 and 17%. Given that one of the objectives of reform is to ensure effective representation of the electorate in terms of equality of votes, this threshold is far from being acceptable."

4.     Preferential party ballots

Dion’s small districts need a preferential party ballot to help prevent a Conservative false majority. A party would be dropped from the count in favour of your second choice party if it didn't get enough votes to elect someone in your small district. If a party gets less than 16% of the vote in a five-seat district, those votes will transfer to those voters’ second choice. Therefore, he calls it his “P3 model (proportional-preferential-personalized).”

This is not as good as Irish STV, because there are no surplus transfers.  In Ireland, in a five-seat district, if a party wins more than enough votes for two MPs but not enough for three, the first step in the counting process is to transfer the surplus to those voters’ second choice, so that no votes are wasted and every vote counts equally. For example, the Green Party in Ireland used to elect 6 MPs with only 4% of the first preference votes because it got a rich harvest of transfers from being the frequent second choice on ballot surpluses.

In 73 of his small districts with 304 MPs, my projection shows 12 districts where the preferential ballot changes the local outcome.

In five districts where the Conservatives and NDP split the seats, Liberal second preferences push the NDP ahead for an extra seat: five-seater Windsor-Sarnia, four-seater Niagara, five-seater Simcoe—Muskoka, five-seater Edmonton North, and three-seater Nanaimo—North Island. Similarly, in five-seater Quebec City, the outcome would be NDP 2, Conservatives 2, Bloc 1, until Liberal second preferences give the NDP a seat from the Conservatives.  Similarly, in four-seater Montérégie-ouest the NDP and Bloc would have elected two MPs each until Liberal second preferences give the NDP a seat from the Bloc. In three districts the Liberals are just short of a quota for a seat -- four-seater Durham Region, five-seater Southwest New Brunswick, and five-seater Longueuil -- until Green second preferences (and in Longueuil Conservative second preferences) push them over the quota. Similarly, in two districts the NDP gets a seat only after picking up Green second preferences: five-seater Mississauga, and five-seater Halton—Guelph. In special single seats, NDP second preferences give the Liberals MPs in Labrador and Yukon.

Still, in 61 districts the preferential ballot made no difference.  

5.     Strategic voting is alive and well

Dion writes “. . . voters should be allowed not only to rank parties by preference, but also to select a candidate. They would choose the candidate they prefer from among those put forward by the party they select as their top preference. In other words, voters would choose only one candidate in the party of their first choice.”

To vote for a candidate, you must make his or her party your first choice. If your second choice counts, it counts for a candidate you had no voice in ranking. If you don’t expect your first choice to win a seat – like almost all Green Party voters – you will be tempted to vote for another party in order to be allowed to rank a candidate. Who said strategic voting was dead?

6.     Referendum?

He writes “Precedent makes holding a referendum necessary in Canada: changing the voting system would require popular support. To get this support, Canadians must be presented with a voting system that provides them with better influence over the political system.”

The 55% of Canadians who live in single-MP communities will mostly vote against Dion’s model since it would cost them a locally-accountable representative.

Note that Charest’s government was ready to introduce PR in Quebec without a referendum, and the NDP is ready too. The Law Commission recommended "The federal government should prepare draft legislation on a mixed member proportional electoral system as proposed in this Report. After drafting the legislation, a Parliamentary committee should initiate a public consultation process on the proposed new electoral system."

Assumptions
 
Of course, these projections assumes voters voted as they did in 2011. In fact, if voters knew every vote would count, more would have voted -- typically at least 6% more. And some would have voted differently, perhaps 18% of them by one study. No more strategic voting. We would likely have had different candidates -- more women, and more diversity of all kinds. Who knows who might have won real democratic elections?

So Dion's "moderate" model might be good for the Greens after all, if they got more votes. Anyway, it's a vast improvement over winner-take-all. But by having no local MPs, it would be much less appealing in single-MP communities than
the Law Commission's MMP model.

Other options

The real Swedish model would work better: they allocate 11 per cent of their MPs to top up the regional results, with similar results to
the Mixed Member Proportional model recommended by the Law Commission of Canada. Except the Law Commission’s MMP model would let us elect two-thirds of the MPs from local single-member ridings, and the other one-third from regional open lists, so every MP has faced the voters: the regional vote can be cast by marking your ballot with an X for any regional candidate standing on the regional ballot.

I look forward to comments.